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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we explore the connection between Central Bank Independence (CBI)
and inflation under alternative political regimes. We formulate a predictive model that
accommodates CBI in the analysis of inflation and thereafter we regroup the countries
based on the choice of political regimes as well as the level of development. We find that
CBI has a statistically significant and negative effect on inflation in countries adopting
full democratic and partial autocratic regimes; but are statistically insignificant in
countries operating full autocratic and partial democratic regimes. The results leading
to this conclusion are robust to different levels of development.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The world over, central banks are mandated with a rather daunting task of
maintaining price stability to which it deploys monetary policy to regulate the
value, supply, and cost of money in the economy, in consonance with expected
level of economic activity (see Zhang and Clovis, 2010; Cuestas and Harrison,
2010; Kapur, 2013; Hassler and Meller, 2014; Antonakakis et al., 2016; Canarella
and Miller, 2017). This in essence acknowledges that central banks are confronted
with multiple macroeconomic objectives including external balance and output
growth, however, the literature recognizes price stability as the principal objective
of the central bank’s monetary policy. Nevertheless, scholars have argued that
maintaining stable prices is a requisite for achieving other core central bank
mandates like raising economic welfare and growth potential in an economy (see
Lin and Ye, 2009; Kapur, 2013; Bratsiotis et al., 2015; Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl,
2017). The case-study of the Federal Reserve is worthy of mention which see price
stability as a prerequisite for the achievement of its other mandates such as full
employment (see Wynne, 2008).
In line with the direction of this study, an issue of concern is that the ability
of a central bank to commit to its mandate may be influenced by the institutional
framework it is positioned, which either enhances or threatens the central bank
independence.1 Theoretically, one could expect that with a fully independent
central bank, insulated from political pressures, commitments to monetary policy
can be more credible since it is able to resist the pressure to make short-term policy
decisions that are at variance with its long-term objective of price stability (see
Rogoff, 1985; Walsh, 2005; Bodea and Hicks, 2015; Garriga and Rodriguez, 2020).
For instance, a central bank that is subservient to the government may not credibly
commit to price stability, especially when governments have discretionary control
over monetary instruments and decide to prioritize other policy goals over price
stability (see Mas, 1995).2 In such a scenario, politicians merely explore monetary
policy to produce short-term boosts in employment and output for electoral
purposes and thus undermine the central bank’s credibility to pursue sound
monetary policy goal.
Empirical evidence on the role of CBI in the low inflation mandate of central
banks are rather inconclusive and open to further scrutiny as the findings appear
to vary for different economic classifications. The extant studies have largely
established negative relationship between CBI and the level of inflation3 for the
case of industrialized countries (see World Bank, 1992; Cukierman 1992; Lohmann,
1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996; International
1

2

3

CBI conceptually refers to the freedom of monetary authorities from direct political or government
interference in the conduct of monetary policy (Walsh, 2005). It is the ability of the monetary
authorities as guaranteed by the act of law to formulate monetary policies void of political or fiscal
authority’s interference.
This is what is often described in the literature as time-inconsistency of commitment to price stability
(see Barro and Gordon, 1983) where the pledge is to discretion, rather than rules, in the operation of
central banks.
A number of other studies have examined different dynamics of inflation although without CBI (See,
Nghiem and Narayan, 2021; Rizvi and Sahminan, 2020; Narayan, 2019; Salisu, Ndako and Oloko,
2019; Salisu and Isah, 2018; Salisu, Isah, Oyewole and Akanni, 2017; Bathaluddin and Waluyo, 2011)
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Monetary Fund, 1999; Berger et al., 2001; Bernhard et al., 2002; Klomp and de Haan,
2010; Hayo and Hefeker, 2010; Arnone and Romelli, 2013). Conversely, there is
no such evidence of a general relationship between CBI and inflation in the case
of developing economies (see Bagheri and Habibi, 1998; Crowe and Meade, 2007,
2008; Desai et al., 2003; Bodea and Hicks, 2015; Garriga and Rodriguez, 2020). In
addition to the varying outcomes of the impact of CBI on the inflation dynamics,
the further source of concern is whether the hypothesis of relative effectiveness
of CBI in the developed compared to developing countries is due to the system
of government in these economies. The motivation for this lies in the arguments
that a wide variety of institutional/political factors could influence the nature and
magnitude of CBI (see Cukierman, 1994; De Haan and Siermann, 1996; Bagheri
and Habib, 1998; Keefer and Stasavage, 2003; Hayo and Voigt, 2008). Surprisingly,
there has been little or no attempt to understand whether the inconsistency of
the empirical results between the developed and developing countries is due
to political regime and level of development. Hence, we evaluate the research
question: do political regime and level of development influence the CBI and
inflation relation? This constitutes the main contribution of our study.
Consequently, we offer two distinct contributions to the literature on the
subject. First, we assess the role of political regime in CBI-inflation nexus. Two
notable studies that have also accounted for the role of political regime in the
examined nexus are Garriga and Rodriguez (2020) and Kokoszczyński and
Mackiewicz‐Łyziak (2020). However, in the latter study, the role of political regime
is included in the predictive model as an additional determinant of inflation rather
than assessing how it can influence the impact of CBI on inflation. In other words,
including political regime as another determinant of inflation does not address
the question of how political regime can influence the impact of CBI on inflation.
While Garriga and Rodriguez (2020) address this question, the analysis is only
limited to the developing countries, and therefore, the outcomes are limited to
the scope considered. In other words, developed and emerging countries whose
level of central bank independence is quite strong (Garriga, 2016) are completely
ignored in the study. Thus, we offer a broader perspective where all the available
categories of countries are captured in the analysis of the nexus between CBI
and inflation. This is the first study to cover an array of these categories of
countries (developing, emerging, and developed countries) on the subject while it
simultaneously accounts for the role of political regime. Thus, we are able to offer
a more representative generalization about the possible role of political regime in
CBI-inflation nexus.
The second contribution relates to how the disparities in the state of
development among the developed, emerging, and developing countries can
influence the impact of CBI on inflation. While both Garriga and Rodriguez (2020)
and Kokoszczyński and Mackiewicz‐Łyziak (2020) also account for the level of
development in the analysis of the CBI-inflation relationship, the variable is only
included as an additional regressor in the inflation model. Thus, the question
about how this regressor can affect the impact of CBI on inflation is not realized
in the two mentioned papers. Again, this is different from what is evident in the
literature (including Kokoszczyński and Mackiewicz‐Łyziak (2020) and Garriga
and Rodriguez (2020) where level of development is included as an additional
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2022
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regressor in the predictive model of inflation). Including the level of development
as another determinant of inflation does not address the question of how the
disparities in the state of development can influence the impact of CBI on inflation.
Consequently, both political regimes and level of development are captured as
intervening variables between CBI and inflation and not as predictors of inflation
as done in most studies. We are able to achieve this by regrouping the countries
accordingly thus circumventing parameter proliferation of having to create six
additional variables (three each) for political regimes and level of development if
we were to use interaction terms4 (the classification of countries by political regime
and level of development).
Meanwhile, empirical results from our study reveal that central bank
independence has a negative and significant effect on inflation rate in countries
adopting full democracy, but insignificant for countries operating full authocratic
system of government. Even after controlling for the role of level of development
and outliers, the results remain unchanged. On the other hand, considering the
case of countries operating non-perfect autocratic and democratic government, the
reverse is observed. In other words, the negative CBI-inflation effect is significant
for countries operating partial autocracy, but insignificant for countries operating
partial democracy.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the
data and methodology used in this study. Section III discusses main findings and
Section IV concludes our paper.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data
The dataset employed for this study are annual inflation rates collected
from International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF (see https://data.imf.
org/?sk=4C514D48-B6BA-49ED-8AB9-52B0C1A0179BandsId=1390030341854)
and the Central Bank Independence Index (CBI) obtained from Garriga (2016).
The construction of CBI relies on the Cukierman et al. (1992) criteria to cypher
proxies used to describe the attributes of the chief executive officer of the bank:
(1) appointment, dismissal, and term of office; (2) the bank’s policy formulation
(i.e. who formulates and has the final decision on monetary policy); (3) the role of
the central bank in the budget process; (4) objectives and limitations on lending to
the public sector. The scores are combined in a single index that ranges from zero
(lowest independence) to one (highest independence) (see Garriga and Rodriguez,
2019).
The selected countries are classified into 4 groups: full autocracy, partial
autocracy, partial democracy, and full democracy. This classification is derived
from the form of government in practice in each of the countries based on the
democracy index of the Economist Intelligence Unit (available online at www.
eiu.com or https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index). For further analysis,
we categorize the data into two sub-samples, based on level of development of
4

The list countries derived from the classification by political regime and level of development can be
made available upon request.
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the countries; namely developed and developing countries. For ease of analysis,
emerging economies are grouped along with developed one and developing
economies remain in a separate group. This grouping is based on the classification
of World Economic Situation and Prospects (see WESP, 2019) of the United Nations
Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The data scope ranges from
1990 to 2012 for 176 selected countries. The data scope is guided by the availability
of the CBI data only available up to 2012. Interestingly, we do not expect this to
affect the results markedly as the classifications of the countries based on form of
governance and level of economic development have largely remained the same
between 2012 and now.
B. Methodology
When central banks are shielded from political pressures, its credibility is boosted
and the problem of dynamic inconsistency is helped mitigated (Bodea and Hicks,
2015b). It is on this basis, that the literature stresses the importance of enforced
commitment rules over discretion and emphasizes the need to delegate monetary
policy to independent central banks (Rogoff, 1985). In theory, the most prominent
benefit of CBI is enshrined in the inflationary bias of government as argued
by Kyland and Prescott (1977) and Baron and Gordon (1983). It is noted that
government easily gives in to short-term electoral benefit at the expense of longterm price stability. Given the numerous theoretical explanations and solutions
for inflation-bias problem, it is widely hypothesized that a direct and negative
relationship should be observed between CBI and Inflation. Consequently,
several studies have been able to establish this relationship (e.g., Cukierman et al.,
1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Masciandaro and Spinelli, 1994) while others
have observed varying patterns across group of countries (Kokoszczyński and
Mackiewicz‐Łyziak, 2020) and thus no consensus has been reached in the literature
over the direction of the relationship. For this reason, empirical researchers have
underlined the need to employ a larger set of panel data to allow for studies
to model this relationship across a larger group of countries (e.g., Dincer and
Eichengreen, 2014; Kokoszczyński and Mackiewicz‐Łyziak, 2020). Furthermore,
it is suggested that empirical research attempting to model this relationship in
a way that accommodates inter-country differences particularly for political and
economic variables (Polillo and Guillen, 2005; Bodea and Higashijima, 2017;
Papadamou et al., 2017). Thus, for the empirical analysis, we regroup our datasets
in line with their choice of political regime and the level of development.
This regrouping enables us to isolate the role of CBI in inflation dynamics
while any endogeneity bias due to the exclusion of other important determinants
is resolved in the estimation process. Consequently, we adopt the heterogeneous
panel data technique following the work of Westerlund et al. (2016). One of the
attractions to this technique lies in its suitability for long time-series dimension
(T) and its ability to resolve any inherent nonstationarity as well as the associated
endogeneity bias. The model has the following form:5
5

We are grateful to Ditzen (2018, 2019) for providing the relevant codes for the estimation of dynamic
panel data models with dynamic common correlated effects. +
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(1)
(2)

where πit is the annual CPI-inflation series computed as 100*log (CPIit/CPIi,t-1) with
CPIit being the consumer price index data for Country i at period t; cbiit is the
central bank independence series based on the study of Garriga (2016); αi and δi
represent the heterogenous intercept and slope coefficients which are allowed to
vary across the units; and eit is the error term. Note that eit is a composite error
term comprising an unobserved common factor loading (ft) accompanied with
a heterogeneous factor loading (λi) and the remainder error term (μit) (see the
appendix on the definition of various political regimes and levels of development).
From Equation (1), the null hypothesis of no predictability expressed as H0:
δi=0 is tested against the alternative hypothesis of predictability which can either
be negative or positive, H0: δi≠0 depending on the degree of independence. For
the purpose of estimation, we follow the procedure of Chudik and Pesaran (2015)
which is also similar in spirit to Westerlund et al. (2016). These estimators allow for
Common-Correlated Effects (CCE) in the estimation process and ignoring same
may lead to biased outcomes.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The presentation is divided into sub-sections based on the research objectives. The
first objective tests whether monetary policy effectiveness using price stability as a
proxy differs between the two extreme systems of government (i.e. full democratic
and full autocratic regime). In the second objective, we test whether the outcome
will remain the same for countries with partial democratic and partial autocratic
regime. The third objective involves testing whether the level of development has
a role to play in the nexus. In other words, do we expect developed countries
practicing democracy [either full or partial] to perform better [in terms of price
stability] than their developing counterparts practicing the same system of
government? Similarly, do we expect developed countries involved in autocratic
regime [either full or partial] to perform better [in terms of price stability] than
their developing counterparts practicing the same system of government. Lastly,
we check for the sensitivity of the results to outliers. All these objectives put
together constitute the main contributions of the study.
A. Does the Response of Inflation to Central Bank Independence Differ between Full
Democratic and Full Autocratic Regime?
We proffer answer to this question using the bivariate predictability model
presented in Equation (1) and the dynamic panel common correlated effects
estimators (DCCE) by Chudik and Pesaran (2015). Notably, bivariate predictability
model has been widely used in the existing literature and has been justified
based on its ability to present the direct and unhindered relationship between
the dependent and the independent variables (see for example, Westerlund and
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v25i2

6

Salisu et al.: CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND PRICE STABILITY UNDER ALTERNATIVE P
Central Bank Independence and Price Stability Under Alternative Political Regimes:
A Global Evidence

161

Narayan, 2012, 2015; Narayan and Gupta, 2015; Salisu et al., 2018, 2019; Olofin et al.
2020). While our classification of countries ensures that countries are homogeneous
in terms of the system of government they operate, or their level of development, it
may be erroneous to assume that the countries within each group are not actually
correlated. Common correlated effects estimators is aptly adopted to capture
possible cross-sectional correlation within group, in addition to the heterogeneous
effects captured by the regular panel heterogeneous models involving the Pooled
Mean Group (PMG) and Mean Group (MG) estimators.
Table 1 presents the result for the CBI-Inflation nexus for full democratic
and full autocratic countries. Apparently, the result shows that central bank
independence has negative and significant effect on inflation rate for countries
adopting full democracy, but has insignificant effect on inflation rate of countries
operating full autocratic system of government. In other words, the higher the level
of central bank independence in countries operating full democracy as a system of
government, the higher the ability of their central bank to maintain price stability.
Meanwhile, changes in CBI appear to have no significant effect on the ability of
central bankers to maintain price stability under an autocratic government. This
is not surprising as any increase in the level of central bank independence under
an autocratic government is only a de-facto increase, i.e., inefficient to promote
stability. We draw similarity between this result and the work of Kokoszczyński
and Mackiewicz‐Łyziak (2018) and Agoba et al. (2017) who find an inverse relation
between central bank independence and inflation. Although, it also contrasts with
the findings of Garriga and Rodriguez (2020) where a negative relationship is
obtained in some autocratic countries, however, our result is unique as it draws
inference for autocratic and democratic group of countries, while their results
make inference for developed and developing countries.
Table 1.
CBI-Inflation Nexus for Full Autocratic and Full Democratic Countries
The variable lcbi is the natural log of CBI index. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significant,
respectively. See the appendix for the composition of countries involved in FA and FD.

Variables
Constant
lcbi(-1)
R-squared (MG)
No. of groups
Obs per group (T)
No. of obs

Full Autocracy (FA)
Coefficients
Std. Err
P>|z|
-6.0483
-50.9804
0.34
42
22
924

38.2901
51.4049

38.2901
0.874

Full Democracy (FD)
Coefficients Std. Err P>|z|
1.0009
-6.0427**
0.64
22
22
484

0.6455
2.3560

0.121
0.010

B. Does the Response of Inflation to Central Bank Independence Differ between Partial
Democratic and Partial Autocratic Regimes?
Furthermore, we examine the case of countries operating a less restrictive
autocratic or democratic system of government under partial autocracy and
partial democracy, respectively. Results in Table 2 confirm an inverse relation
between central bank independence and inflation. However, while this negative
effect is significant for countries operating partial autocracy, it is insignificant
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2022
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for countries operating partial democracy. In other words, an increase in central
bank independence under a partial autocratic regime would cause significant
reduction in inflation rate and promote price stability. Whereas an increase in
central bank independence under a partial democratic regime is a mere de-facto
increase; inefficient to promote price stability. This result suggests that a partially
autocratic government is more liberal in the management of monetary policy than
a partially democratic government. In other words, governments promote real
independence of monetary policy management as they move from full autocracy
to partial autocracy and retract real independence of monetary policy management
as they move from full democracy to partial democracy. This result is similar to
the findings of Garriga and Rodriguez (2020) who note that CBI-inflation nexus in
some non-democratic countries is negative. Following Jetter et al. (2015), this may
be because of increase in corruption in countries where democracy is not fully
implemented. Under this condition, the ruling class takes interest in the monetary
policy management; thus, reduce the efficiency of the central bank independence
to inflation rate and promote price stability.
Table 2.
CBI-Inflation Nexus for Partial Autocratic and Partial Democratic Countries
The variable lcbi is the natural log of CBI index. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance,
respectively. See the appendix for the composition of countries involved in PA and PD.

Variables
Constant
lcbi(-1)
R-squared (MG)
No. of groups
Obs per group (T)
No. of obs

Partial Autocracy (PA)
Coefficients
Std. Err
P>|z|
-63.7874**
-279.672**
0.36
37
22
748

25.25067
122.1643

0.012
0.022

Partial Democracy (PD)
Coefficients Std. Err
P>|z|
-14.2885
-45.0025
0.11
49
22
1034

11.2472
39.3359

0.204
0.253

C. The Role of the Level of Development
Evidence shows that there is no consensus in the literature on the role of level of
development. For example, Agoba et al. (2017) find that CBI cannot sufficiently
lower inflation in Africa and the developing world. Whereas Kokoszczyński
and Mackiewicz‐Łyziak (2018) suggest a stronger impact of CBI on inflation for
non-advanced economies. In the context of our objective, we further analyze the
role of level of development in addition to accounting for the role of system of
government. Notably, our results have shown that CBI does not have significant
effect on price level stability in a full autocratic system but have negative significant
effect on price level stability in a full democratic system. The objective of this
section is to investigate whether this result will change if we account for the level
of development of the countries involved. Thus, we examine whether the result
of the effect of CBI on inflation under full autocratic/full democratic system of
government is dissimilar for a developed country and developing country6.
6

Emerging countries are merged with developed countries as the per capita income of some emerging
countries is comparable to that of a developed country.
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Table 3 shows the effect of CBI on inflation rate of the developed and
developing countries operating full autocratic system of government, while
Table 4 shows the effect of CBI on inflation rate of the developed and developing
countries operating full democracy. From Table 3, the effect of CBI on inflation
rate is statistically insignificant. This is regardless of whether the countries are
developed or developing. This suggests that level of development does not matter
in the effect of CBI on inflation rate of countries operating full autocratic system.
In other words, CBI does not have significant impact on inflation rate of countries
operating full autocratic system regardless of whether the country is a developed
or a developing country. By implication, the central bank independence of the
monetary authority of a country operating full autocratic system of government
will be inefficient to maintain price stability.
In addition, evidence from Table 4 shows that the effect of CBI on inflation
rate under a full democratic regime is negative and statistically significant for both
developed and developing economies. This suggests that variation in the level of
development of countries does not matter in the effect of CBI on inflation rate
in countries operating full democracy. By implication, the hypothesis that higher
level of central bank independence in countries operating full democracy as a
system of government enhances the ability of their central bank to maintain price
stability holds, irrespective of whether the country operating the full democracy
is a developed or a developing country. Generally, our findings contradict that of
Kokoszczyński and Mackiewicz‐Łyziak (2020) who claims that CBI has a different
effect on inflation on different group of countries, especially when grouped by
level of development.
Table 3.
CBI-Inflation Nexus for Developed and Developing Full Autocratic Countries
The variable lcbi is a measure of central bank independence. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance, respectively. See the appendix for the composition of countries involved in FA-DE and FA-D.

Variables
Constant
lcbi(-1)
R-squared (MG)
No. of groups
Obs per group (T)
No. of obs

Full Autocracy (Dev/Emerg.)
(FA-DE)
Coefficients
Std. Err
P>|z|
-49.7163
-124.6196
0.46
7
22
154

49.97474
119.020

0.320
0.295

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2022

Full Autocracy (Developing)
(FA-D)
Coefficients Std. Err
P>|z|
2.68529
-36.2526
0.33
35
22
770

44.9441
57.3197

0.952
0.527
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Table 4.
CBI-Inflation Nexus for Developed and Developing Full Democratic Countries
The variable lcbi is a measure of central bank independence. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance, respectively. See the appendix for the composition of countries involved in FD-DE and FD-D.

Full Democracy (Dev/Emerg.)
(FD-DE)
Coefficients
Std. Err
P>|z|

Variables
Constant
lcbi(-1)
R-squared (MG)
No. of groups
Obs per group (T)
No. of obs

0.8999
-5.0844**
0.65
20
22
440

0.69239
2.4672

0.194
0.039

Full Democracy (Developing)
(FD-D)
Coefficients Std. Err
P>|z|
2.0108
-15.625***
0.35
2
22
44

2.0108
4.97337

0.317
0.002

D. Are the Results Sensitive to Outliers?
Recent empirical studies such as Salisu et al. (2020) note that the presence of
outliers could influence the outcome of an experiment. Outliers in this study are
the countries with running inflation in the period under consideration. From
the 42 countries operating full autocratic system of government, nine countries
(Azerbaijan, Belarus, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Russia, Sudan and Tajikistan)
are regarded as outliers in this study given the incidence of running inflation over
the period under consideration. The result for the other thirty-three countries,
with relatively stable inflation rate, is presented in Table 5. Evidently, the results
reveal that central bank independence does not have significant effect on inflation
rate of countries operating full autocratic system of government, which mirrors
the result obtained when the outliers are included (see Table 1) suggesting that
outliers do not matter to our main results. By implication, it indicates that the
result that a negative and statistically insignificant relationship exists between CBI
and inflation in countries operating full autocratic system is robust, not only to
variation in level of development but also to exclusion outliers.
Table 5.
CBI-Inflation Nexus for Full Autocratic Countries (Less Outliers)
The variable lcbi is log of CBI, a measure of central bank independence. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and
10% level of significant, respectively. FA-O countries include Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo DR, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatoria Guinea, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Maldives, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger,
Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Togo, UAE, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe. O countries include
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Russia, Sudan and Tajikistan.

Variables
Constant
lcbi(-1)
R-squared (MG)
No. of groups
Obs per group (T)
No. of obs

Full Autocracy (Less outliers) (FA-O)
Coefficients
Std. Err
P>|z|
2.906797
-6.88283
-0.01
33
22
726
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study investigates the role of system of government in the nexus between
Central Bank Independence (CBI) and price level stability. Specifically, it tests
whether the effect of CBI on price stability differs between countries operating
full autocratic and full democratic systems of government using relevant
heterogeneous panel data techniques. It also investigates whether the outcome
from these extreme cases can be generalized for the non-perfect autocratic and
democratic systems.
Empirical results from this study reveal that central bank independence has a
negative and statistically significant effect on inflation rate in countries adopting
full democracy, but insignificant for countries operating full autocratic system of
government. Even after controlling for the role of level of development and outliers,
the results remain unchanged. In other words, CBI has a negative and statistically
significant effect on inflation rate of countries operating full democratic system
of government, regardless of whether the country is developed or developing,
and regardless of whether the country records running inflation (is an outlier) or
not. On the other hand, CBI does not have significant impact on inflation rate of
countries operating full autocratic system of government regardless of whether
the country is developed or developing, and regardless of whether the country
records running inflation or not.
Considering the case of countries operating non-perfect autocratic and
democratic government, the reverse is observed. In other words, the negative
CBI-inflation effect is significant for countries operating partial autocracy, but
insignificant for countries operating partial democracy. This result appears to
suggest that partially autocratic government is more liberal in the management
of monetary policy than partially democratic government. Put differently,
governments tend to promote real independence of monetary policy management
as they move from full autocracy to partial autocracy and retract real independence
of monetary policy management as they move from full democratic to partial
democratic. This is an interesting puzzle for future researchers to revisit and may
open up debate for the political economy of autocratic regimes. Notwithstanding,
future analyses that ignore the role of system of government in the nexus may
report biased outcomes.
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Appendix
Table A: List of Important Concepts
Full Name

Full Autocracy

Full Democracy

Partial Autocracy

Partial Democracy

Full Autocracy
(Developed/Emerging)
Full Autocracy
(Developing)
Full Democracy
(Developed/Emerging)
Full Democracy
(Developing)
Full Autocracy (Less
outliers)

Definition/calculation
Nations operating full autocratic regimes usually
involve absolute monarchies or dictatorships. They are
also characterized by the following: (i) infringements and
abuses of civil liberties; (ii) lack of free and fair elections (if
they take place); (iii) control/ownership of the media by the
State or the ruling regime; (iv) lack of judicial autonomy;
and (v) suppression of governmental criticisms.
Nations operating full democracies enjoy civil liberties
and fundamental political freedoms. Under this system of
government, there are governmental checks and balances,
independence of the judiciary, and independence of the
media as well as freedom of speech.
Nations operating partial autocratic regimes involve
regular electoral frauds, preventing them from being
fair and free democracies. This system of government
usually exhibits the following: (i) the practicing nations
usually apply pressure on political opposition; (ii) lack of
independence of the judiciary, (iii) widespread corruption,
harassment and pressure placed on the media, and (iv)
anaemic rule of law, and more pronounced faults than
partial democracies in the realms of underdeveloped
political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and
issues in the functioning of governance.
Nations operating partial democracies usually enjoy fair
and free and basic civil liberties but may have limited
media freedom and minor suppression of political
opposition and critics. These nations have significant faults
in other democratic aspects, including underdeveloped
political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and
issues in the functioning of governance.
Developed or Emerging economies who practice full
autocratic system of government.
Developing economies who practice full autocratic system
of government.
Developed or Emerging economies who practice full
democracy system of government.
Developing economies who practice full democratic system
of government.
Full autocratic countries less some countries with extreme
inflation figus
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